Specific Controls the General, Except When It Doesn't: Mandatory Minimums and Illegal Sentences

In the 2017 edition of my PCRA book, I noted that mandatory minimum sentencing issues are considered illegal sentencing claims, but that the specific provision in the statute dealing with legality of sentence claims applies when the sentence exceeded the lawful maximum. At the time of the adoption of the PCRA statute, the courts had not yet held that mandatory minimum sentencing questions pertained to the legality of sentence. Accordingly, although the scope provision of the PCRA, which is more general, provides that the PCRA applies to remedy illegal sentences, I cautioned that counsel should, when possible, make sure to label there claims under the ineffectiveness rubric.

In my own filings, I also have argued that habeas corpus could apply, relying on the concurring decision of former Chief Justice Castille in Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013), wherein he opined, in the Eighth Amendment context, that where a federal constitutional decision alters state constitutional law, habeas is still available. These precautions no longer appear to be necessary based on the decision in Commonwealth v. DiMatteo, __ A.3d __ (Pa. 2018) (filed January 18, 2018). There, the High Court held that, in a timely petition, the petitioner was entitled to relief on a pure illegal sentencing claim based on imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence, where the sentence was not yet final at the time of the United States Supreme Court decision in Alleyne.

The majority (and the concurring opinion) recognized that the specific provision in the statute did not appear to apply, but found that mandatory minimum sentencing claims entitled petitioners to relief because the sentence was illegal and the PCRA was intended to address illegal sentencing claims.